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Abstract 
 
Human trafficking represents one negative side affect of an increasingly interconnected, 
globalized world. What characteristics of regional trade drive bilateral human trafficking 
flows? Resource dependent states, or states with an economy established primarily 
through resource exports, interact with more industrialized states to push and pull 
populations into human trafficking schemes as a byproduct of economic and political 
linkages. The adverse conditions of resource dependence push populations into 
trafficking networks while traffickers and trafficking victims are drawn to economic 
opportunity in more stable regional trade partners. This theory is tested using ordinal 
logistic and OLS regression, utilizing cross sectional and time series datasets that capture 
both trafficking flows and state efforts to combat trafficking. The analyses support the 
theoretical expectation that economic linkage between resource dependent states and 
industrial states is positively associated with human trafficking rates for both destination 
and source countries. In conclusion, different causal factors for human trafficking may be 
at work in source and destination states.  
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Introduction 
 Human trafficking is an issue that has captured the attention of Hollywood, the 
media, and governments across the planet. Some consider trafficking a threat to global 
security, as countless numbers of individuals are moved across state borders without the 
knowledge of sovereign countries (Shaw 2004; Dinan 2008). Many see it as a human 
rights issue, where victims are pushed into coercive situations by poverty and abusive 
regimes (Cho 2011b; Kelly 2005). Others see it as an organized crime network seeking to 
exploit vulnerable populations to make a profit, much like any drug or gun trafficking 
ring (Williams 2008; Icduygu 2002). Still, some researchers see the issue as an inevitable 
byproduct of the modern international political economy (True 2012; Kyle 2011). Each 
approach improves our understanding of the causes and consequences of trafficking, but 
scholars still have an incomplete understanding of the phenomenon.  
In this paper,  I seek to help improve our understanding of trafficking patterns by 
investigating whether or not resource-dependent states create a socioeconomic structure 
that promotes trafficking into their more developed, secondary producing trade partners. 
When discussing trafficking routes and destinations, a region transcends national 
boundaries by including the resource dependent state and any regional trade partners. 
While most research has focused on human rights or criminal justice systems when 
analyzing the causes and effects of human trafficking, I determine if the economic 
relationship of resource dependent states and their trading partners promote trafficking. 
Some other national characteristics examined here include: 1) economic characteristics, 
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such as: wealth in terms of GDP per capita or state of industrialization for each state 
respectively; and 2) political characteristics of both the source and destination states, such 
as levels of corruption, income inequality, or institutional strength. Understanding what 
kind of political and economic characteristics allows traffickers to function will help 
researchers better understand why traffickers operate more heavily in some areas and less 
heavily in others. This research has potential policy implications by identifying the 
unique trafficking mechanisms present in source and destination states, thus allowing 
governments to more efficiently apply their counter-trafficking efforts.  
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Literature Review 
Section 1- Definitions for Trafficking  
Although trafficking has drawn the attention of numerous governments and 
international organizations, there is little consensus on definitions differentiating human 
trafficking from human smuggling. It is important, however, to clearly distinguish 
between the two so that future research, and this project in particular, can build upon 
current and past literature without having to argue whether or not they are separate 
phenomena.  
One of the most accepted official definitions for human trafficking comes from 
the Palermo Protocol, or the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 2000. The Protocol defines human trafficking as: 
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other 
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits 
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs... The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended 
exploitation set forth [above] shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth 
[above] have been used. 
 
In this paper, human trafficking differs from human smuggling when the 
individuals transitioning across borders are exploited for the financial gain of the 
traffickers upon arrival or during the transit phase (Kyle 2011; Gallagher 2002; Salt 
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1997; Raimo 2003; Apap 2002, Balarezo 2013). It is also worth noting that traffickers use 
the people they traffic as “goods” to be sold or exploited. To avoid normative questions 
in this paper, these trafficked individuals are primarily referred to as victims, though it is 
still important to understand the profit-minded nature of human trafficking. This is not 
intended to belittle the value of human life, but to emphasize the primary drivers of 
human trafficking from an objective standpoint. 
Traffickers often function within the context of a network, wherein an individual, 
other than the guide, will receive the victims and move them into exploitive situations 
(Icduygu 2002; Kyle 2011; United Nations 2010; Dinan 2008; Raimo 2003; Lee 2011; 
Simmons 2010). Trafficking involves three main steps: recruitment of vulnerable 
populations, transportation of victims across borders or sub-national regions, and 
exploitation of victims for private monetary gain (United Nations 2010; Von Lampe 
2003). In this paper, I will focus on both the trafficking of humans within and across 
national borders, the last two steps in the process above.  
Though not explicitly tested for in any of the models in this paper, sex trafficking 
often flourishes under the same conditions as labor trafficking. Other forms of human 
trafficking can include child labor (EUROPOL 2011), organ trafficking (Bowden 2013, 
Balarezo 2013), or forced marriages (Hossain 2001, Balarezo 2013). Labor trafficking, 
which is the focus of this paper, is the movement of people to be used as forced labor, 
whether by the state, rebel groups, or private agents. (EUROPOL 2011; Jägers 2014; ILO 
2005; Bales 2007, 2009).  
The International Labor Organization proposes several indicators for forced labor, 
including: threats or actual physical harm, restriction of movement, debt bondage, 
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withholding of wages, retention of passports, or threat of denunciation to the authorities 
(Bales 2009, 34). The majority of trafficked men will be moved for this purpose, though 
children and women also represent a significant portion of labor trafficking victims 
(Jägers 2014). These trafficked victims and those under forced labor represent significant 
hidden populations in many states, and their presence likely have very real social, 
political, and economic ramifications. Many labor victims begin as illegal migrants or 
partners in an employment contract, but have their identification documents taken from 
them upon arrival. They are then told that they have incurred a “debt” that they must pay 
off. The individuals are forced to work and live in poverty for little to no pay so that they 
can never escape the system (Kyle 2011; Bales 2009). Globalization, notwithstanding the 
aggregate benefits, has given rise to this new group of people, known as “survival 
migrants” (Bimal 1998). Many of these migrants will quickly become victims of labor 
trafficking in developing states with new industrial sectors hungry to meet the needs of 
supply and demand.  
Section 2- Theoretical Approaches 
 The three main theoretical approaches to human trafficking are: the human 
rights/victim approach, the criminal justice/trafficker approach, and the political 
economic/business approach. The human rights approach emphasizes the role of poverty 
and abusive regimes in pushing people into trafficking schemes (Cho 2011b; Gallagher 
2002; Kelly 2005).  This approach is the most well known, as media outlets have 
repeatedly drawn attention to sex trafficking. It has an inherent normative tone, as 
prostitution, sex slavery, and the idea of a “perfect victim” appeal to both religious and 
gender rights groups (Uy 2011). Because this approach focuses mainly on sex trafficking 
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and gender rights, it does not describe the full realm of causal mechanisms for human 
trafficking. 
The criminal justice approach more closely examines the criminal networks that 
make up trafficking organizations and the prosecution and/or prevention methods of 
governments (Salt 2002; Lee 2010; Raimo 2003; Felsen 2005). This approach tends to 
focus exclusively on failures of national security apparatuses, such as border security 
(Chacon 2009). The policy recommendations of this approach are to strengthen border 
security, strengthen immigration procedures, and more clearly document immigrant 
workers. This approach ignores the fact that many trafficking victims are coerced, and 
therefore enter a country using legal documentation. It also does not analyze the causal 
mechanisms of human trafficking for either the traffickers or the victims, and instead 
treats human trafficking as a failure of the state national security system.  
 Finally, the political economic approach examines human trafficking as a 
business. This approach operates on the assumption that traffickers’ behavior is driven by 
a desire to maximize their profits (Aydan 2011; Belsar 2011; Raimo 2003). Traffickers 
will operate in regions and countries where they can get the most for their “goods”. This 
approach captures the driving factors for both traffickers and victims, while also 
including the systemic mechanisms that make trafficking profitable and possible.  
 While each approach offers a new perspective and offers different policy 
recommendations, my theory asserts that the political economic approach most clearly 
addresses the systemic causes of human trafficking. This study expands upon existing 
political/economic human trafficking literature and provides a more fully developed view 
of the core economic driving factors behind human trafficking between trading partners.  
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Building off of the findings of Balarezo (2013) and the political/economic human 
trafficking literature, I argue that highly corrupt states with porous borders, high levels of 
income inequality, and strong economic linkages with neighboring states will have higher 
rates of human trafficking. Since industrial states need access to cheap labor to make 
their goods, businessmen and corporations might seek the aid of traffickers in cutting 
down labor costs (Aydan 2011). As less developed states seek to maximize their 
economic output, they turn their focus towards gaining a comparative advantage over 
other developing states. Some research suggests that using forced labor can provide those 
states with said advantage (Busse 2002; Belser 2011). One of the goals of this project is 
to fill a gap in the human trafficking literature by considering the effects of resource 
dependence within states.  
Section 3- Effects of Resources on States 
Reliance on natural resource export rents as the primary form of state income can 
create the national and subnational characteristics that make trafficking more likely in a 
region. In this paper, resource dependence is not defined by a specific threshold, but by 
percent of GDP generated from resource exports rents relative to the second state in a 
trade dyad. The distinction between the resource dependent (or primary producer) and 
manufacturing state (or secondary producer) will be further explained in the theory 
section. The resource dependent state can be all three types of trafficking hubs: source, 
transit, and destination. I argue, however, that the resource dependent state is most likely 
to be the source country, while the secondary producer will be the destination. Victims 
will likely be moved out of the economically weak state and into a more developed, 
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stable state that needs access to cheap labor. Thus, it is important to understand some of 
the broad effects resources can have on a state.  
Natural resources are a valuable economic tool for developing states. The Middle 
East has taken great leaps towards modernization on the back of oil revenues. Malaysia, 
Thailand, and China have all used their natural resources to transition into semi-industrial 
or industrial economies. Brazil used its wealth of resources to develop into a more 
modernized society. Resources provide raw materials upon which to develop a 
functioning economy, yet many seem to suffer from economic downturn nonetheless. 
One explanation for this phenomenon is that the discovery of resources in a state will pull 
capital and investment away from non-resource sectors (Leite 1999; Tornell 1999). 
Traffickers can draw those suffering from this transition into coercive labor schemes. 
Also, the state often begins to invest heavily in resource-sector infrastructure, while 
ignoring other public goods (Leite 1999; Tornell 1999). The ensuing rent-seeking by 
public officials and drop in labor demand provides access to vulnerable populations for 
traffickers to exploit. This can also lead to the weakening of institutions, allowing 
traffickers to operate with impunity. Sachs and Warner, amongst other researchers, argue 
that resource dependent states may even democratize later than other countries and are 
more likely to have corrupt, autocratic regimes (Sachs1999; 2001; Prichard, 2014). 
Unfortunately, only high levels of democratic institutionalization are able to combat the 
ensuing corruption, and opportunities for trafficking (Frederick 2011; Mehlum 2006).  
 Reliance on resources can also lead to increases in corruption (Leite 1999, 2002; 
Ades 1999; Treisman 2000; Isham 2005; Aslaksan 2007). Under these conditions private 
actors and politicians will begin a campaign of rent-seeking behavior that encourages 
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high levels of corruption as a way to purchase support from the elite (Hodler 2006; 
Frederick 2011). Even high-level political leaders are not immune. Robinson argues that 
politicians can use resource-sector rents to get reelected (if in a democracy) or remain in 
power (if in an autocracy), thus further weakening democratic institutions (2006). High 
levels of corruption and the ensuing effects of rent-seeking can cripple a state, especially 
in their efforts to combat human trafficking. Though the connection between resource 
dependence and human trafficking has not been studied, to my knowledge, I argue here 
that the effects of resource dependence create the conditions that can facilitate trafficking. 
My goal in this project is to bridge the gap in the existing literature on resource 
dependence, regional trade, and the existing literature on human trafficking.  
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Theory 
 I theorize that resource dependent states are partners in a vicious cycle with 
secondary producing states in driving populations into human trafficking schemes as a 
byproduct of regional trade. Resource dependent states exert “push” pressures that 
facilitate human trafficking while secondary producers create “pull” effects on the 
populations of their resource suppliers. I build of the work of Balarezo and argue that 
traffickers respond to the economic forces of supply and demand (2013). I also assume 
that traffickers’ behavior is driven by a rational choice perspective concerning their 
“businesses”. In other words traffickers will evaluate the utility of their decisions based 
on two things: 1) Traffickers seek to maximize their profits; 2) Traffickers seek to 
minimize risk to themselves and their business.    
 
Section 1- The Push Factors  
 States that focus the majority of their economy on resource extraction and 
development suffer from several common effects: 1) high levels of corruption, 2) 
government rent-seeking, 3) high levels of income inequality, 4) economic instability, 
and 5) low institutional strength (Leite 1999; Hodler 2006; Robinson 2006; Frederick 
2011). I propose that each of these effects are theoretically linked with human trafficking 
and serve as facilitators for the industry itself. 
 Resource dependence increases corruption within states, which is often seen as 
the primary mechanism for facilitating the operations of trafficking networks 
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(Bhattacharyya 2010). Traffickers bribe immigration officials, business leaders, and 
politicians, whether through monetary bribes or sexual favors from their victims, to allow 
their goods to safely pass along trafficking routes (Salt 1997).  
 Reliance on primary resources also leads to an increase in rent-seeking behavior. 
Resource rents are the excess profits that can be made from cheaply extracting natural 
resources and then selling them at a much higher price than the cost of production 
(Barma 2012). Rent seeking is when individuals, governments, or companies dominate a 
market and use the profits for personal gain. Rent-seeking acts as a centralizing force in 
the economic sector and leads to severe deprivation of capital and investment from other 
aspects of the economy (Leite 1999). As government spending on infrastructure outside 
of the resource industry declines, economic opportunities for large swathes of the 
population become limited (Nankani 1979). I argue that this lack of opportunity pushes 
many to seek employment opportunities abroad. Complex immigration laws and 
resistance by foreign governments forces many of these people to seek the help of agents 
within illicit trafficking networks, as legal immigration is often not an option.  
 Furthermore, rent-seeking and corruption contribute to severe income inequality 
(Hodler 2006). Combined with the volatile nature of the resource market, income 
inequality can quickly lead to severe social inequality. I theorize that as economically 
marginalized populations are excluded from many aspects of government and society, 
they are pushed into trafficking schemes and away from their homelands. Additionally, 
state dependence on resource exporting rents can increase economic instability. If the 
value of any resources drops due to an increase in supply in other countries or a decrease 
in demand, state income will suffer. This can contribute to the “push” of vulnerable 
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populations in the direction of traffickers as they seek economic stability in other 
countries.  
 Natural resource-based economies can also severely weaken the institutional 
strength of the government (Hodler 2006). As the state increases its reliance on resource 
exporting rents, the government no longer depends on the people regarding taxation or 
contribution to the economy. This can lead to decreases in welfare and public good 
spending. State officials can use resource export rents to stay in power through patronage, 
bribes, or monetary gifts to the elite. This further erodes the state’s capacity to combat 
corruption and prevent traffickers from crossing national borders. As the quality of 
institutions begins to erode, the government loses its connection to the public, and vice 
versa. This can provide traffickers the freedom to exploit and transport groups seeking 
more social benefits in other countries. These populations, ostracized by their own states, 
cannot seek the help of foreign governments once they have been trafficked. If they do, 
they run the risk of being arrested or deported as illegal immigrants. This strengthens the 
traffickers’ hold on their victims across both destination and transit states.  
 I posit that corruption, rent-seeking, income inequality, economic instability, and 
weakened institutions work in tandem to push populations away from resource dependent 
states. If these populations stay in their home countries, they face a severe lack of 
economic opportunity and government aid. Under these conditions, populations attempt 
to leave the country in order to find greater opportunity in other states. This leads to my 
first four hypotheses. 
 H1) The higher the ratio of resource rent exports to total GDP in a state, the 
higher the amount of trafficking out of a state. 
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Section 2- The Pull Factors 
 I specify in hypothesis 1 that I expect an increase in trafficking outflows from the 
source state. Logically, an increase in outflows in one state should lead to an increase in 
inflows in another. I theorize that the regional trade partners of the resource producing 
state will pull traffickers and their victims into their country. These trading partners are 
likely using the resources of the resource dependent state to create secondary, 
manufactured products. If traffickers seek to maximize their profits, then it is intuitive for 
them to seek out buyers in wealthier states where there is a demand for cheap labor. 
These secondary producing states will seek to attain a comparative advantage against 
other manufacturing states, increasing the demand for cheap labor. Developing states are 
also more likely to have low labor standards in the proverbial “race to the bottom” 
(Davies 2013), making it easier for traffickers to hide their victims amongst other 
laborers in an already poorly-regulated industrial sector. This manifests itself broadly in 
poor regulatory quality within the secondary producing state. The government chooses 
not to regulate the economy or grow the private sector. In many ways, as these states are 
pressured to lower the costs of their goods while also increasing production, we see 
mechanisms of globalization facilitating the expansion of human trafficking.  
  I argue that traffickers drawing their victims from resource dependent states will 
also target regional trading partners because close political, economic, and cultural ties 
result in relatively more porous and increase the ease of access into states (Balarezo 
2013). I assume in this paper that traffickers will seek out the safest routes, or routes in 
which they are the least likely to get caught by the authorities (Balarezo 2013). I also 
   Stuck in Traffic	17	
argue that they will seek the easiest routes, or routes that will allow for quick and cheap 
transportation of victims (Balarezo 2013). The easiest routes are more than likely going 
to include the shortest possible distance between source and destination country, 
especially if the majority of the travel will be in the form of walking or driving. This may 
seem counter-intuitive, since more conventional, short routes, like guarded border 
crossings, airports, or train stations are often the most heavily monitored. The traffickers 
must evaluate which routes give them the most utility in terms of profitability and 
secrecy. These networks often operate within the same communities as their target 
populations. They may share a common culture and language, which allows traffickers to 
quickly manipulate potential victims into positions of vulnerability. This is why victims 
often give their consent to false job opportunities without realizing they might be falling 
victim to a trafficking scheme.  
 Victim consent is an effective tool for the traffickers. If they deceive their victims 
into believing that they are being offered a better life, then migrants are more likely to 
cooperate along the journey. This lowers the risk of detection for the traffickers and 
makes the transit phase much easier. Also, cooperation by the victims means that 
traffickers can choose the safest, more heavily monitored routes without significantly 
increasing the risk of detection. Uncooperative victims might force traffickers to transport 
them along less conventional means, like shipping containers on boats, mountain passes, 
or illegal routes outside regular border crossings. This eliminates most of the risk of 
detection but increases the risk of the death of the victims, thus nullifying their worth to 
the traffickers. It also increases the cost in monetary investment, mostly in the form of 
food, water, and shelter for the victims. Traffickers might also need consent to limit 
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traveling duration, since mountain passes and illegal routes will take longer than public 
transit and increase operating costs (Lee 2011; Balarezo 2013). That being said, 
traffickers still resort to more abusive and forceful methods if it provides them the 
greatest utility.  
 I further theorize that two politically and economically linked states will lower 
travel barriers as they seek to encourage mutual trade. This dynamic can serve to 
facilitate new transit options for traffickers to exploit. The European Union is a clear 
example of this. Once inside the Schengen Zone, there are little to no travel restrictions 
between EU members. Traffickers will have less utility for illegal crossings, which are 
often more difficult and dangerous, when they can simply walk, drive, or ride a train 
across international borders. Often times, as economic ties increase, the two states will 
invest heavily in infrastructure to facilitate trade. This leads to an increase in border 
crossings, including bridges, roads, and other trade routes, each of which gives the 
traffickers another possible crossing point.  
 While these routes might still have some oversight by the government, traffickers 
have several ways to mitigate the risk of detection. Trafficking networks often disguise 
themselves as perfectly legitimate travel agencies or international businesses (Kyle 
2011). They can forge documents for their victims (though most victims use their legal 
ones) to make the transition phase smoother. This places the victims into more of a 
“client” position throughout the transit phase, further increasing the perceived legitimacy 
of the trafficking operation.  
  This leads to the second hypothesis.  
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 H2) The greater the economic/political links between a secondary producing state 
and its regional trade partners, the higher the rate of trafficking inflows to the secondary 
producer.  
 Once again, I specify that an increase in regional trade will lead to an increase in 
trafficking inflows for the secondary production state. Traffickers are responding to the 
pull effects of supply and demand for labor, much like any licit corporation would. 
Traffickers choose to make the secondary producers their destination states, fully 
recognizing the demand for labor and the potential for high profit margins.  
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Research Design and Methodology 
Dependent Variable 1/Model 1- The temporal domain for this model is the year 
2006 and includes 408 dyads. This model is a cross-sectional ordered logit using an 
ordinal dependent variable from the work of Balarezo (2013). She recoded the “traffic 
linkage” variable used in the Cho 3P index into four categories: no flows, low flows, 
medium flows, and high flows (Cho 2011). The Balarezo variable, coded as “HTflow” in 
the dataset, is collected from the 2006 UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 
(2013). The report shows data on both transit and destination countries for actual 
recorded human trafficking events. This document is exclusive to the year 2006 and 
cannot be considered a complete record of human trafficking, as most of trafficking 
remains undetected. Additionally, the transit state may not be the actual source state for 
each observation, but, for lack of alternatives, will be considered the source state in this 
project.  
 Dependent Variable 2/Model 2- To make up for this lack of robustness and 
capture human trafficking over time, this paper includes a second time series analysis 
using OLS regression with the Cho 3P index (2011). This index measures the efforts of 
states to combat human trafficking through three categories: prevention, protection, and 
prosecution. There is also an aggregate score coded for each country on a 3-15 scale, 
which is what is used in the analysis, coded as “overall_3p”. Cho constructed this index 
to measure government efforts to combat human trafficking within their borders. Though 
far from a perfect measure for human trafficking flows, it is reasonable to think states that 
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score higher on the index will experience lower flows of human trafficking into and out 
of their borders. This model complements the first in helping us understand what causal 
mechanisms may influence trafficking rates in both destination and source countries from 
a slightly altered perspective. I incorporate independent variables in this model that could 
not be included in the first due to a small sample size and limited degrees of freedom. 
The temporal domain for this model ranges from 2000 to 2009 and includes 27,768 
dyads. This temporal domain is used because it is the full range used in the Cho 3P Index.  
 The primary independent variable in both my models is recourse dependence. I 
also test several control variables in the models that the literature asserts are important 
mechanisms in facilitating human trafficking. They can be broken into two main 
categories: measures for the push effects of resource dependent states (hypothesis 1) and 
measures for economic linkages between countries (hypothesis 2). The first group of 
variables consists of factors that serve to push individuals into the schemes of traffickers 
as they seek greater economic and social stability outside their origin country.  
 
Primary Variable 
1) Resource Dependence- This variable is operationalized as the total percentage 
of GDP per capita captured resource rent exports. This can be found in the World Bank 
Indicators and is coded in the dataset as “resource_dependence”. Resource dependence is 
tested in both the OLS models as well as the Ordered Logit models.  
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Control Variables 
2) Corruption- Corruption is measured using the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI hereafter), which uses a 0 (high corruption) to 100 (low corruption) scale.  The 
variable is coded in the dataset as “corruption” using a 10-point scale in place of the 100-
point scale. Corruption is commonly accepted as one of the most prominent causal factors 
of human trafficking.  
3) Income Inequality- This variable is operationalized using the GINI Index in 
the World Bank Indicators. The index uses a 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect 
inequality) scale, measured by the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line 
of absolute equality expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. The 
variable is coded in the dataset as “gindex” using the 100-point scale. Income inequality 
is tested in the OLS model only. While it would be ideal to include it in both models, 
incorporating the gindex variable in the logit models significantly limits the n values in 
both source and destination states due to missing data.  
The concept of institutional strength is broken into four variables, each of which 
tap into a different aspect of state institutional strength. They are all measured by the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (available from the World Bank) on a -2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) scale of government performance. They are: regulatory quality, rule of law, 
voice/accountability, and government effectiveness.  
 4) Regulatory Quality- This variable measures the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. It is coded as “regulatory_quality” in the dataset. Regulatory quality 
is only tested in the ordered logit models, as those models are more economic focused 
   Stuck in Traffic	23	
since they test the relationship of the independent variables on actual, measurable 
trafficking rates as opposed to the 3P proxy.  
5) Rule of Law- This variable measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. In particular, it caputres the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. It is coded as “rule_of_law” in the dataset. This variable is only 
tested in the OLS models, as those models capture government responses to human 
trafficking.  
6) Voice/Accountability- This variable measures the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. It is coded as 
“voice_accountability” in the dataset. This variable is only tested in the OLS models 
since it captures government effectiveness and response to human trafficking.  
7) Government Effectiveness- This variable measures the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. It is coded as “government_effective” in the 
dataset. Again, this variable is only tested in the OLS models.  
The next major group of variables measures the level of economic linkage 
between countries. These economic linkages open up safer and quicker routes for 
traffickers to exploit when trafficking victims cross national borders.  
8) Bilateral Trade- This variable is measured by the total value of bilateral trade 
in US dollars between two countries. The data comes from the Correlates of War 
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database using International Monetary Fund data reports on sovereign states and their 
trading partners. Bilateral trade is coded as “totflow” in the dataset. This variable is only 
tested in the logit models as it represents economic linkage between two states and 
severely limits the n in the other models. This variable is especially useful since it 
captures the total economic value of trade in a dyad, measuring the magnitude of 
economic linkage in each.  
9) Free Trade Agreements- This variable measures the total number of free trade 
agreements each dyad is jointly a party to. The data was coded by Balarezo to measure 
theporousness of borders (2013). This paper builds on her research by not only testing for 
political and economic linkage through FTAs, but also using the total value of bilateral 
trade between each dyad. She coded this variable using a count ranging from 1 to 36. The 
original data used to conduct her coding comes from the Regional Trade Agreements 
Information System at the World Trade Organization. This variable is tested only in the 
logit models and is coded as “Number_RTAs” in the dataset.  
In addition to these independent variables, the models control for population, 
wealth, distance, and contiguity. Population and wealth are measured by the World Bank 
Indicators in total population and GDP per capita, respectively. Population is coded in the 
dataset as “population” and wealth is coded as “gdppc”. Distance and contiguity limit the 
effects of great distances on human trafficking. Both are measured using the GeoDist 
dataset from CEPII (Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales). This 
dyadic dataset measures the distance between a dyad as well as codes a dummy variable 
for contiguity. Distance is coded as “dist” in the dataset and contiguity is coded as 
“contig” in dummy format.  
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Data Collection Issues- The lack of consensus on definitions for trafficking, 
along with poorly collected or incomplete data, makes it difficult for researchers to 
progress in the accumulation of knowledge regarding human trafficking (Dunne 2012; 
Tyldum 2010). Some states consider all trafficking victims illegal immigrants, and 
therefore do not document them as trafficking victims (Gallagher 2002). Not only do 
states have different definitions and recording methods, the activity itself is highly 
clandestine and targets hidden populations in states with low institutional strength (Bales 
2007; Tyldum 2010; Chakarova 2015). Traffickers operate almost everywhere, whether it 
is in the shadows of cities or the rural countryside of developing countries. Those that do 
escape from the trafficking system are marginalized as illegal immigrants in a foreign 
country. They might not speak the language and they likely fear the authorities. Even if 
they make it back to their homes, many of them face rejection from their families due to 
the stigma of being forced into prostitution or demeaning manual labor for little to no pay 
(Chakarova 2015). All of these factors, the clandestine nature of trafficking, the stigma of 
being a victim, recruitment from states with low institutional capacity, lack of 
transparency within states’ record keeping, corruption levels in government, and lack of 
standardized definitions for trafficking, make it less likely that states or researchers will 
be able or willing to document victims of trafficking (Salt 2002). Without this 
documentation, most statistical analysis must be done on a state-by-state or regional 
level. For this reason, my study exclusively focuses on regional trade, as trafficking 
across longer distances is poorly documented. 
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Results 
Table 1: Ordered Logit for Source States 
Trafficking Flows Coefficient  P>|z| 
# of FTAs 0.036 0.000*** 
Regulatory Quality 0.696 0.010** 
Total Bilateral Trade 0.000 0.000*** 
Resource Dependence -0.001 0.823 
Corruption -0.250 0.053 
Notes: ***p<.001; **p<.05                       N=408 
There are a number of striking results from this model, which analyzes the 
relationship between human trafficking flows and the total value of bilateral trade for 408 
dyads in the year 2006. Keep in mind that these first two models capture relationships 
within source and destination states separately. First, hypothesis 2 is supported by the 
positive relationship between # of FTAs and total bilateral trade with high flows of 
human trafficking. Table 1 shows that the higher number of trade agreements a state has, 
the more likely it is to be the source of higher flows. Both are found to be statistically 
significant factors in predicting high trafficking flows from a source state. Secondly, both 
resource dependence and corruption are found to be statistically insignificant. This is 
surprising for several reasons. Corruption is widely held to be a strong causal mechanism 
in source states for human trafficking, yet it is insignificant in this model. Resource 
dependence, which I argue causes high levels of corruption, income inequality, and rent-
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seeking behavior, was also found to be insignificant. Finally, regulatory quality was 
found to have a positive relationship with human trafficking. 
 
Table 2: Ordered Logit for Destination States 
Trafficking Flows Coefficie
nt 
 P>|z| 
# of FTAs -0.031 0.020** 
Regulatory Quality 0.762 0.003** 
Total Bilateral Trade 0.000 0.000*** 
Resource Dependence 0.116 0.058 
Corruption 0.222 0.015** 
Notes: ***p<.001; **p<.05                        N=408 
For destination states, resource dependence is not statistically significant, as 
shown in table 2. The relationship is positive, however, where there was a negative 
relationship for source states. Interestingly, the relationship of # of FTAs and human 
trafficking is negative in the case of destination states. Regulatory quality becomes 
positively correlated with human trafficking in this model, supporting my argument that 
traffickers will seek out more economically stable countries for their destination states. 
Corruption is significant in this model, but counter to the literature, has a negative 
relationship with human trafficking.  
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Table 3: OLS Regression for Source States 
Total 3P Score Coefficien
t 
 P>|z| 
Rule of Law -15.737 0.000*** 
Voice and Accountability 1.870 0.020** 
Corruption -0.856 0.047** 
Resource Dependence -1.002 0.000*** 
GINI Score -0.281 0.000*** 
Effectiveness of Government 14.598 0.000*** 
Notes: ***p<.001; **p<.05                    N=27,768 
 All variables were found to be statistically significant in this model for source 
states, as displayed in table 3. Surprisingly, rule of law was found to have a strong 
negative relationship with 3P scores. This was the only measure of institutional quality 
found to have a negative relationship in source states, which means there could be a fault 
in the data or the model. Voice and accountability and the effectiveness of the 
government are both positively correlated with strong government action against 
trafficking, which supports both hypotheses. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are also supported by 
these findings, as the effects of resource dependence include high resource export rents, 
high levels of corruption, and high income inequality.  
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Table 4: OLS Regression for Destination States 
Total 3P Score Coefficien
t 
 P>|z| 
Rule of Law -15.567 0.000*** 
Voice and Accountability -1.731 0.065 
Corruption -5.194 0.000*** 
Resource Dependence -1.136 0.000*** 
GINI Score -1.003 0.000*** 
Effectiveness of Government 26.023 0.000*** 
Notes: ***p<.001; **p<.05                         N=27,768 
 Interestingly, rule of law and accountability were both found to have a negative 
relationship with 3P scores in destination states, though accountability was not 
statistically significant. Table 4 shows how relationship of corruption and income 
inequality to 3P scores was much stronger in this model, which supports the idea that 
corruption and social inequality are causal factors driving human trafficking in both 
destination and source countries. Government effectiveness also had a greater impact on 
3P scores in this model. 
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Analysis and Conclusions 
 Many of the findings in the ordered logit models run counter to my theoretical 
expectations. The results are highly volatile, however, which could be attributed to a low 
number of observations. Many of the results from these models were not supplemented 
by similar findings in the OLS model. For instance, the OLS model found that corruption 
was statistically significant and positively associated with human trafficking in both 
source and destination states. The logit model, however, found corruption to be 
insignificant in source states and negatively correlated with human trafficking in 
destination states. This could be due to limitations of the trafficking data, higher 
corruption reporting in more developed countries, higher reporting of trafficking events 
in non corrupt states, or even a product of the dyadic measures used in this project. In 
fact, the logit model consistently supports only hypothesis 2.  
 The inconsistencies in the results could be due to data limitations, but could also 
illustrate that separate mechanisms exist in source and destination states. Source states 
seem to experience higher levels of human trafficking when they share a high number of 
FTAs with their trade partners, but destination states show the opposite. Corruption is 
statistically insignificant in source states, but is negatively correlated with trafficking 
flows into destination states. Perhaps this is simply because destination states tend to be 
more developed, and corruption manifests self somewhat differently than in these states. 
These states may have lower levels of corruption, but the presence of corruption is still a 
key factor in allowing trafficking to occur. Due to the dyadic nature of the data, the 
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corruption level might simply just be higher relative to the source state. Though counter 
to the literature, these findings may indicate that corruption needs to be further studied in 
the human trafficking literature. 
 The OLS model had significantly more consistent results across source and 
destination countries. This model supported both of the hypotheses. Resource 
dependence, income inequality, low institutional quality, and corruption were all 
negatively associated with human trafficking (with the exception of rule of law). The 
inconsistencies across models could be attributed to the use of the 3P Index, which does 
not measure actual trafficking events, and the large disparity between sample sizes, but 
there does seem to be support for the presence of very real, and very distinct, push and 
pull factors at work across source and destination states. The inconsistency of the 
findings show that a single model cannot accurately account for both trafficking inflows 
and outflows. Instead, political scientists must narrow their research to the push or pull 
factors on a state-by-state basis. According to this study, economic and political linkages 
allow traffickers to operate, but the causal mechanisms for inflows and outflows are very 
different. Each should be researched independently so as to better understand which 
socioeconomic structures facilitate inflows over outflows or vice versa. This would allow 
trafficking scholars and governments alike to better understand the behavior of victims 
and traffickers. Scholars should also re-evaluate the role of widely accepted causal 
mechanisms such as corruption and income inequality in regards to human trafficking. 
Corruption is an important factor in allowing trafficking to occur, but it seems to interact 
with trafficking rates differently in source vs. destination states.  
   Stuck in Traffic	32	
 As political scientists move forward with empirical research on human 
trafficking, it is vital that they focus on improving data collection. Current data is 
severely limited in both scope and consistency. Most data is coded using annual 
qualitative government yearly reports. These reports sometimes focus narrowly on only 
one aspect of human trafficking and rarely directly measure actual human trafficking 
rates. So long as political scientists are unable to determine the magnitude or direction of 
trafficking flows, it will be difficult to empirically research causal mechanisms beyond 
the national level of analysis. While this may provide useful information to practitioners 
and scholars, it gives little perspective on what is a very globalized issue. Without more 
systematic data, it will be difficult for researchers to make significant progress into the 
understanding of human trafficking flows.  
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